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- Barron's · 12 Jun 2026 Marks admits he didn't foresee private credit growing from zero to $1.7 trillion in fifteen years.
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Then and now 29 pairs
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consistent returns · 183 days apartThen said
“Historically, if you bought at this PE ratio, your return over the next ten years averaged in the very low single digits.”
Now said“You apply the right financial structure, which also which often means leverage, you add value intrinsically to the operation, and you see it go to a premium valuation relative to what you pay.”
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consistent returns · 101 days apartThen said
“What the relationship means is that an asset that appears to be risky has to appear to offer a high return or else nobody will buy it.”
Now said“You apply the right financial structure, which also which often means leverage, you add value intrinsically to the operation, and you see it go to a premium valuation relative to what you pay.”
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consistent returns · 86 days apartThen said
“I think you would have to say, optimism, not pessimism, credulousness, not skepticism, are in the ascendancy today, and when optimism and credulousness are in the ascendancy, it gets hard to make return investments that will produce what we call excess returns,”
Now said“You apply the right financial structure, which also which often means leverage, you add value intrinsically to the operation, and you see it go to a premium valuation relative to what you pay.”
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consistent returns · 80 days apartThen said
“I would say that as of a year or so, maybe two years ago, direct lending was, as you say, you use the term alpha, it was no longer special.”
Now said“You apply the right financial structure, which also which often means leverage, you add value intrinsically to the operation, and you see it go to a premium valuation relative to what you pay.”
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consistent private credit · 80 days apartThen said
“And so so called nonbank lenders stepped in to make the loans that the banks weren't making.”
Now said“I didn't foresee the growth of private credit, which the part of private credit which loans money for mid sized buyouts we call direct lending.”
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consistent credit cycle · 53 days apartThen said
“There's nothing wrong with lending money to companies. The question is, do you do it wisely?”
Now said“Well, the the credit markets have been on a tear for the most part of the last seventeen years.”
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consistent private credit · 53 days apartThen said
“There's nothing wrong with lending money to companies. The question is, do you do it wisely?”
Now said“I didn't foresee the growth of private credit, which the part of private credit which loans money for mid sized buyouts we call direct lending.”
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consistent credit cycle · 39 days apartThen said
“So rather than thinking of cycles as ups and downs, which I think most people do, think of them as excesses and corrections, excesses and corrections.”
Now said“Well, the the credit markets have been on a tear for the most part of the last seventeen years.”
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consistent market psychology · 16 days apartThen said
“The scariest thing in the world, the riskiest thing in the world is the belief there's no risk.”
Now said“I'll say since 10/01/2022, which is a special date for a reason, it's when the Fed turned more dovish.”
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consistent market psychology · 16 days apartThen said
“So the point is that that whereas, the underlying thing progresses gradually, the price fluctuates wildly around that trend line, and the main reason is, the fluctuation of psychology.”
Now said“I'll say since 10/01/2022, which is a special date for a reason, it's when the Fed turned more dovish.”
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consistent private credit · 0 days apartThen said
“I'm told that there are roughly 700 direct lending managers. So the the the And the availability of that $1,700,000,000,000 put a lot of people into business and made a lot of people extremely successful along with a very favorable economy and with low or generally low or generally declining interest rates, which are salutary.”
Now said“If I don't cut the price of this loan, my competitor will make the loan, and I'll have to look on. So these this is what happens.”
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consistent private credit · 0 days apartThen said
“So the the the And the availability of that $1,700,000,000,000 put a lot of people into business and made a lot of people extremely successful along with a very favorable economy”
Now said“If I don't cut the price of this loan, my competitor will make the loan, and I'll have to look on. So these this is what happens.”
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consistent private credit · 0 days apartThen said
“I'm told that of the 700, roughly 3% were in business before the global financial crisis. So we don't know how many of them are have what it takes to deal with a harsh environment.”
Now said“If I don't cut the price of this loan, my competitor will make the loan, and I'll have to look on. So these this is what happens.”
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consistent private credit · 0 days apartThen said
“I'm told that there are roughly 700 direct lending managers. So the the the And the availability of that $1,700,000,000,000 put a lot of people into business and made a lot of people extremely successful along with a very favorable economy and with low or generally low or generally declining interest rates, which are salutary.”
Now said“I didn't foresee the growth of private credit, which the part of private credit which loans money for mid sized buyouts we call direct lending.”
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consistent private credit · 0 days apartThen said
“I'm told that of the 700, roughly 3% were in business before the global financial crisis. So we don't know how many of them are have what it takes to deal with a harsh environment.”
Now said“I didn't foresee the growth of private credit, which the part of private credit which loans money for mid sized buyouts we call direct lending.”
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consistent valuation · 1501 days apartThen said
“it's not what you buy, it's what you pay that determines whether your investment is risky or not. B, that good investing is not a matter of buying good things, but buying things well.”
Now said“And, you know, those things showed the the market to be, I used the expression a year ago, lofty but not nutty.”
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consistent valuation · 293 days apartThen said
“And it showed that historically, you bought the S and P when the PE ratio was 23, in every case, there were no exceptions.”
Now said“And, you know, those things showed the the market to be, I used the expression a year ago, lofty but not nutty.”
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consistent bubbles · 241 days apartThen said
“To me, the main ingredient in bubbles is psychological excess. There's no such thing as a price too high.”
Now said“In every case, too much capital flowed in. I think it's fair to say too much infrastructure was built and prices were paid that were too high.”
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consistent bubbles · 241 days apartThen said
“And I don't detect that level of mania at this time, so I have not put the bubble label Right. On this on this incident.”
Now said“In every case, too much capital flowed in. I think it's fair to say too much infrastructure was built and prices were paid that were too high.”
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consistent bubbles · 241 days apartThen said
“And I don't detect that level of mania at this time, so I have not put the bubble label Right.”
Now said“In every case, too much capital flowed in. I think it's fair to say too much infrastructure was built and prices were paid that were too high.”
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consistent bubbles · 182 days apartThen said
“And the question is, will the implementation prove to have been excessive in scope and in in the way it's financed?”
Now said“In every case, too much capital flowed in. I think it's fair to say too much infrastructure was built and prices were paid that were too high.”
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evolved bubbles · 110 days apartThen said
“I've never heard anybody tell me how AI is going to change the world. We know it's a powerful force. Can think, it can process data.”
Now said“So I wrote in a memo recently this year, and I think it's true that if this technological innovation with its exuberance doesn't produce a money losing bubble, it'll be the first.”
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consistent bubbles · 110 days apartThen said
“I've never heard anybody tell me how AI is going to change the world. We know it's a powerful force. Can think, it can process data.”
Now said“In every case, too much capital flowed in. I think it's fair to say too much infrastructure was built and prices were paid that were too high.”
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consistent bubbles · 110 days apartThen said
“You're never going to have a bubble in paper stocks or timber stocks. It's too prosaic. People can say, well, we can tell how many houses you're going to build.”
Now said“In every case, too much capital flowed in. I think it's fair to say too much infrastructure was built and prices were paid that were too high.”
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consistent valuation · 79 days apartThen said
“And if you bought the stocks the day I got to work in '69 and you held them for five years, the greatest companies in America, you lost about 95% of your money.”
Now said“And, you know, those things showed the the market to be, I used the expression a year ago, lofty but not nutty.”
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consistent risk · 52 days apartThen said
“There's nothing wrong with lending money to companies. The question is, do you do it wisely?”
Now said“I'm told that of the 700, roughly 3% were in business before the global financial crisis. So we don't know how many of them are have what it takes to deal with a harsh environment.”
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consistent valuation · 52 days apartThen said
“When I was a kid and came into this business in '69, the Nifty Fifty were selling at PE ratios between sixty and ninety. So today's Mag seven in the thirties seem reasonable.”
Now said“And, you know, those things showed the the market to be, I used the expression a year ago, lofty but not nutty.”
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consistent valuation · 52 days apartThen said
“I happen to believe that the Mag seven, most of or all of them are the best companies I've ever seen.”
Now said“And, you know, those things showed the the market to be, I used the expression a year ago, lofty but not nutty.”
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consistent valuation · 38 days apartThen said
“So, it was a and so that was a real disaster for the people who invested in the Nifty Fifty, which was most of the money center banks.”
Now said“And, you know, those things showed the the market to be, I used the expression a year ago, lofty but not nutty.”
Minutes 280 quotes
everything on record, newest first
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Marks identifies October 1, 2022 as the turning point when Fed dovishness began driving market optimism.
fed policymarket psychologyReceipt
“I'll say since 10/01/2022, which is a special date for a reason, it's when the Fed turned more dovish.”
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Marks says investors must prepare for less optimistic times even while optimism drives markets higher.
market psychologyoptimismReceipt
“And part of that means with everything you do, some part of your body has to be saying, yes, but how do we prepare for less optimistic times?”
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Marks says credit markets have been on a seventeen-year run since the 2009 financial crisis low.
credit cyclegfcReceipt
“Well, the the credit markets have been on a tear for the most part of the last seventeen years.”
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Marks describes competitive pressure forcing lenders to cut loan prices to avoid losing deals.
credit cyclemarket psychologyReceipt
“If I don't cut the price of this loan, my competitor will make the loan, and I'll have to look on. So these this is what happens.”
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Marks argues the current credit cycle is likely the longest in history despite pandemic interruption.
credit cyclehistoryReceipt
“I think the credit cycle has been very strong. It's gone on with the interruption of the pandemic, probably the longest time in history.”
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Marks sees no reason for the Fed to cut rates given the economy is performing fine.
economyfed policyReceipt
“I don't see any reason to cut rates. I don't think this economy needs stimulus. The economy is doing fine.”
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Marks argues companies are not failing and investors paint software concerns with too broad a brush.
distressmarket psychologyReceipt
“It I I think there's an expectation. And and, you know, investors tend to paint things with the broad brush and not make fine distinctions.”
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Marks believes market worry about software sector distress is excessive and outcomes will be better than expected.
distressmarket psychologyReceipt
“I think today, if you could if you could ascertain people's expectations, I personally think that the that the level of worry and the universality of worry with regard to software is probably excessive.”
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Marks admits he didn't foresee private credit growing from zero to $1.7 trillion in fifteen years.
direct lendingmarket evolutionReceipt
“I didn't foresee the growth of private credit, which the part of private credit which loans money for mid sized buyouts we call direct lending.”
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Marks outlines four ways to achieve superior returns: buying below value, financial structure, adding operational value, and premium valuations.
investingreturnsReceipt
“You apply the right financial structure, which also which often means leverage, you add value intrinsically to the operation, and you see it go to a premium valuation relative to what you pay.”
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Marks notes declining rates made financial engineering and leverage particularly effective at generating returns.
credit cycleleverageReceipt
“In this period we've been through of declining interest rates, financial engineering helped a lot, merely owning assets with leverage helped a lot, things regularly went to premium valuations.”
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Marks states nobody can specify what AI will do, when, for whom, or how much profit it will produce.
aiprofitabilityReceipt
“I've never heard anybody tell me exactly what AI will be able to do or when or for whom or how much profit it'll produce and for whom.”
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Marks lists historical technological innovations from railroads in 1860s through internet in 2000 as comparisons.
bubbleshistoryReceipt
“So the technological innovations I'm talking about, let's just for a starting point, let's say the railroads back in the 1860s And then radio in the nineteen twenties, the automobile, computers in the nineteen fifties and sixties, internet in 2000.”
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Marks says every prior technological bubble saw too much capital flow in, too much infrastructure built, and investors lose money.
bubbleshistoryReceipt
“In every case, too much capital flowed in. I think it's fair to say too much infrastructure was built and prices were paid that were too high.”
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Marks wrote that if AI exuberance doesn't produce a money-losing bubble, it will be the first technological innovation not to.
aibubblesReceipt
“So I wrote in a memo recently this year, and I think it's true that if this technological innovation with its exuberance doesn't produce a money losing bubble, it'll be the first.”
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Marks calls AI the hardest thing he has ever seen in investing due to enormous uncertainty.
aiinvestingReceipt
“This is the hardest thing I think I've ever seen in the investment world because of this enormous degree of uncertainty.”
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Marks characterizes current market valuations using traditional PE ratios as lofty but not nutty based on year-ago assessment.
market psychologyvaluationReceipt
“And, you know, those things showed the the market to be, I used the expression a year ago, lofty but not nutty.”
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Prof G Markets, 12 June 2026
market psychologynumbersReceipt
“You know, the the the non Shiller PE ratio is about 23 or so today. The eighty year average is 16. So we're roughly 50% higher today. But in 2000, I think it was 32.”
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Prof G Markets, 12 June 2026
historynifty fiftyReceipt
“When I started in this business as a young man, 1969, in the research department at Citibank, the bank and most of the banks invested in what were called the nifty 50, which were considered to be the best and fastest growing companies in America,”
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Marks dates his 1969 start at Citibank research department when banks invested in Nifty Fifty stocks.
biographyhistoryReceipt
“When I started in this business as a young man, 1969, in the research department at Citibank, the bank and most of the banks invested in what were called the nifty 50, which were considered to be the best and fastest growing companies in America, Xerox, IBM, Kodak, Polaroid, Merck, Lilly, Texas Instruments, Hewlett Packard, Coca Cola, Avon, etcetera.”
260 more the default view shows 20
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Marks notes Nifty Fifty PE ratios were 60-90 versus Mag Seven today at PE ratios in the thirties, excluding Tesla.
mag sevenpe ratio“So so to look at at the at the max seven take out Tesla, they're selling at PE ratios in the thirties.”
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Marks says 700 direct lending managers emerged to manage $1.7 trillion in a favorable environment with declining interest rates.
market structurenumbers“I'm told that there are roughly 700 direct lending managers. So the the the And the availability of that $1,700,000,000,000 put a lot of people into business and made a lot of people extremely successful along with a very favorable economy and with low or generally low or generally declining interest rates, which are salutary.”
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Marks reports roughly 700 direct lending managers now manage $1.7 trillion in a favorable economy that made many extremely successful.
direct lendingprivate credit“So the the the And the availability of that $1,700,000,000,000 put a lot of people into business and made a lot of people extremely successful along with a very favorable economy”
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Marks notes only 3% of 700 direct lending managers existed before the financial crisis, questioning their ability to handle adversity.
numbersprivate credit“I'm told that of the 700, roughly 3% were in business before the global financial crisis. So we don't know how many of them are have what it takes to deal with a harsh environment.”
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Marks argues making money in a favorable environment proves nothing, as it can result from luck rather than skill.
credit cyclemarket psychology“To make money in a salutary investment environment, you can do it on the basis of good judgment and hard work and skill, or you can do it on aggressiveness and getting lucky.”
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Marks states Buffett attributes his success to just 12 investments over 60-70 years without many abject failures.
batting averagebuffett“Warren Buffett, the most successful investor of all times, attributes his success to 12 investments over the last sixty, seventy years. Now he didn't have that many abject failures,”
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Marks explains that while underlying progress is gradual, prices fluctuate wildly around trend lines due to psychology.
cyclesmarket psychology“So the point is that that whereas, the underlying thing progresses gradually, the price fluctuates wildly around that trend line, and the main reason is, the fluctuation of psychology.”
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Marks wrote a memo titled The Limits to Negativism in October 2008 after Lehman's bankruptcy.
contrarianglobal financial crisis“I wrote a memo in October of o eight, after the global financial after the bankruptcy of Lehman, with the title, the limits to negativism. And there is such a thing as being too negative.”
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Marks argues you can protect against extreme tail risks but won't like the premium cost.
black swansrisk“I'm concerned that there could be nuclear war, and I'm concerned that there could be inflation at 20%. Mhmm. Well, can protect yourself against that.”
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Marks describes Claude making a wordplay joke when asked to be hypercritical of his memo.
aiclaude“So it writes me back, and it says, do you want me to be hypercritical or hypocritical? It's making a joke.”
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Marks reports Claude made a joke distinguishing between hypercritical and hypocritical.
aiclaude“So it writes me back, and it says, do you want me to be hypercritical or hypocritical?”
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Marks argues AI innovation speed with Claude and coding models is faster than any previous technology.
aianthropic“I think innovation, I think if you look at the Claude and all the coding models and the way they've progressed and the way and the way Anthropix revenues have progressed, I think you have to say that this is faster than anything we've ever seen before.”
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Marks warns AI's innovation speed exceeds society's adjustment capacity, predicting significant dislocation period.
aidisplacement“Mhmm. So you might say it'll catch up, but I think you could I think at minimum, you're talking about a significant period of dislocation.”
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Marks argues AI differs from prior technologies by designing jobs autonomously rather than just doing assigned work.
aiautonomy“AI, it's it's different. It's not just gonna do the job we used to do. It's gonna design new jobs. Mhmm. It's gonna assign new jobs.”
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Marks argues AI differs from prior technologies by autonomously designing and assigning new work without instruction.
aiautonomy“It's gonna take on work we didn't think it could do, and it and and it's gonna operate, at some point in time without instruction.”
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Marks notes ChatGPT's new model helped design itself, which he finds unprecedented.
aiautonomy“And in the write up for the for the model, they said, basically, in English, AI, the model helped us design the model.”
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Marks states the riskiest condition in markets is when people believe there is no risk.
complacencymarket psychology“The scariest thing in the world, the riskiest thing in the world is the belief there's no risk.”
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Marks reframes cycles not as ups and downs but as excesses and corrections around a trend line.
cyclesframework“So rather than thinking of cycles as ups and downs, which I think most people do, think of them as excesses and corrections, excesses and corrections. Fluctuations around the trend line.”
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Marks reframes economic cycles as excesses and corrections around trend lines rather than simple ups and downs.
credit cyclecycles“So rather than thinking of cycles as ups and downs, which I think most people do, think of them as excesses and corrections, excesses and corrections.”
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Marks observes S&P returns almost never fall between eight and twelve percent despite ten percent average.
cyclesmarket psychology“And not only is that an interesting phenomenon to think about, but even more so, the fact that the return on the S and P, which averages 10, is almost never between eight and twelve.”
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Marks states Nifty Fifty investors lost 95% over five years despite being greatest companies in America.
market psychologynifty fifty“if you bought those stocks the day I got to work in September of 'sixty nine, if you held them tenaciously for five years, you lost about 95% of your money.”
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Marks recalls Nifty Fifty PE ratios were sixty to ninety, revealing his role as research director.
historynifty fifty“So, it was a and so that was a real disaster for the people who invested in the Nifty Fifty, which was most of the money center banks.”
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Marks reports Oaktree achieved 99% success rate in bonds paying interest and principal as promised over 48 years.
credit cycleprivate credit“in our experience, ninety nine percent of the bonds have paid interest in principle as promised. So I think I can say almost every time.”
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Marks reports Oaktree's high yield default rate is roughly one-third the market average over forty years.
creditperformance“And so, over the last forty years, on average, something like 3.6 or 3.7% of all high yield bonds have gone into default every year, and our default rate has been roughly a third.”
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Marks states Oaktree's default rate over 40 years was one-third the market average of 3.6-3.7% annually.
credit cycleprivate credit“over the last forty years, on average, something like 3.6 or 3.7% of all high yield bonds have gone into default every year, and our default rate has been roughly a third.”
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Marks questions whether AI can identify future Amazon or Steve Jobs from present information.
aiinnovation“Can AI sit down with five business plans and figure out which one is Amazon? Can AI sit down with five CEOs and figure out which one is Steve Jobs.”
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Marks quotes trader Wally Deemer: When the time comes to buy, you won't want to.
contrarianmarket psychology“And there was a guy named Wally Deemer, was an old time trader, who had some great quotes and he turned them into”
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Marks argues readily available quantitative information cannot produce success because everyone has it.
edgeinformation“readily available quantitative information about the present cannot hold the key to success, because everybody has it. Success in investing is doing better than others.”
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Marks questions whether AI models trained on same history can produce different investment outcomes.
aiinvestment logic“Are some AI models smarter than others? Since they all have super IQs, computing power, and they all are trained on the same history, are some smarter than others?”
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Marks defines cognitive dissonance as the brain's ability to reject information at odds with predisposition.
cognitive dissonanceinvestor behavior“cognitive dissonance is something that you should all familiarize yourself with. And it is basically the human brain's ability to reject information which is at odds with its predisposition.”
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Marks defines cognitive dissonance as the brain's ability to reject information at odds with predisposition.
behavioral financecognitive bias“And it is basically the human brain's ability to reject information which is at odds with its predisposition.”
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Marks argues investors have inherent optimism bias because investing requires giving money hoping for more later.
investing philosophymarket psychology“Because you have to be optimistic to be an investor. What is investing? You take your money, you give it to somebody else in the hope you'll get back more later.”
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Marks dates Trump's tariff announcement to April 1 as a market turning point.
market eventtariffs“April 1, President Trump announced, second, announced some massive tariffs, more much more than had been expected, and put them on, and then a week later paused them, and then put some more on and took some off, and and the the market had a negative reaction.”
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Marks quotes Jamie Dimon saying when you see one cockroach there are probably more.
dimonprivate credit“Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan says a lot of things best. He said, you know, when you see one cockroach, there are probably more. So, people started to say, well, maybe there's something wrong here.”
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Marks explains why timing the bottom is impossible: you can only identify it after the fact.
bottom pickinginvesting philosophy“the bottom is the day before it starts going up. Right? And if that's true, then by definition, you never know when you're at the bottom because you can only tell the next day.”
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Marks says the only basis for buying is that things are cheap, not timing the bottom.
market timingphilosophy“And so, the only basis for buying is that things are cheap. You can tell when things are cheap.”
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Marks describes Oaktree's crisis investing logic: if world melts down, nothing matters; if not, they must invest.
2008 financial crisiscrisis investing“If the world melts down, it doesn't matter what we did today. But if it doesn't melt down and we didn't invest, then we didn't do our job.”
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Marks bought senior debt at prices profitable even if companies worth one-fifth of buyout valuations.
credit cycledistressed debt“we were buying the senior most debt of these companies at prices such that if these companies ended up being worth a third or a quarter or a fifth of what these great buyout firms had bought them for a year or two ago, we would be okay.”
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Marks explains crisis investing requires pre-raised capital, nerve to deploy it, and clean portfolio to act.
capital deploymentcrisis investing“Nobody will give you money to invest during a crisis. We had pre raised it. And you have to have the nerve to spend it.”
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Marks argues good investing comes from buying things well, not buying good things; price determines outcomes.
price disciplinerisk“it's not what you buy, it's what you pay that counts. Good investing doesn't come from buying good things, it comes from buying things well.”
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Marks notes Buffett made all his money on twelve ideas over seventy years, illustrating the scarcity of great investments.
compoundersconcentration“And, you know, Buffet says made all his money on 12 ideas. Guy invested for seventy years. He says he made all his money on 12 ideas.”
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Marks argues private credit managers took in too much money and invested it too fast, making bad decisions.
credit cycleprivate credit“There's nothing wrong with lending money to companies. The question is, do you do it wisely?”
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Marks argues private asset valuation is fundamentally ambiguous with no clear standard for what constitutes fair value.
market psychologyprivate credit“Am I supposed to value these things at what they're worth? What I could sell them for? What I could sell half for?”
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Marks defines proper private asset valuation as the price an intelligent, unemotional buyer would pay today.
private creditrisk“I think it should be valued at what an intelligent, unemotional buyer would pay for it today.”
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Marks notes optimists have been winning the market tug of war for forty-three months.
credit cyclemarket psychology“The pessimist the optimists had basically been winning for the last, I think now it's, forty three months.”
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CNBC Television, 20 April 2026
mag sevenmarket psychology“I happen to believe that the Mag seven, most of or all of them are the best companies I've ever seen.”
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Marks compares today's Mag Seven PE ratios of thirties to Nifty Fifty's sixty to ninety in 1969.
historical comparisonmarket psychology“When I was a kid and came into this business in '69, the Nifty Fifty were selling at PE ratios between sixty and ninety. So today's Mag seven in the thirties seem reasonable.”
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Marks argues government can replace paychecks but not the sense of purpose and structure that work provides.
aimarket psychology“And and the government, in theory, can make up the paycheck, but they can't make up the sense of purpose and the reason to get out of bed and the structure for your day.”
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Marks describes how emotion drives buying when prices rise and selling when prices fall.
emotionhuman nature“Emotion, what we call human nature, tends to get us excited when things go well. And as things go well, prices prices rise rise rise and people wanna buy more and more and more.”
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Marks identifies the biggest investor mistake as believing something can outperform forever, leading to overvaluation.
investment philosophymarket psychology“The the biggest I thought I've spent a lot of time thinking about the biggest mistake that investors make. It is the belief that something can go up more than something else forever.”
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Marks dates the origin of nonbank direct lending to 2011 when banks became unable to meet private equity demand.
banksmarket history“And so so called nonbank lenders stepped in to make the loans that the banks weren't making.”
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Marks says direct lending stopped offering excess returns one to two years ago, delivering only adequate returns.
alphaprivate credit“I would say that as of a year or so, maybe two years ago, direct lending was, as you say, you use the term alpha, it was no longer special.”
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Marks reports direct lending now offers only 100 to 125 basis points over public credit.
pricingprivate credit“Direct lending was fine. It was fair. You got a 100 or a 125 basis points of incremental interest over public credit.”
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Marks questions why investors focus exclusively on private credit while ignoring public credit alternatives.
market psychologyprivate credit“And I would say, let's talk about credit. Why do you skip all the way from zero to private credit, glossing over public credit,”
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Marks describes Oaktree's core philosophy as taking advantage of the mistakes of others.
investment philosophymistakes“Bob said, essentially, what we do is take advantage of the mistakes of others. And that caused me to write a memo shortly after entitled, it's all a big mistake.”
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Marks explains excess returns require buying at unfair prices, not fair ones.
excess returnspricing“We want to get returns that are more than commensurate with risk. And to do that, you have to buy assets not at fair prices, but are unfair prices.”
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Marks notes bargain hunting requires finding sellers willing to sell below fair value.
bargain huntingmarket inefficiency“There's only one catch. It requires cooperation for someone who's willing to sell something for less than it's worth. And who volunteers for that job?”
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Marks explains excess returns require buying from sellers making mistakes, which nobody volunteers for.
bargainsinvestment philosophy“It requires cooperation for someone who's willing to sell something for less than it's worth. And who volunteers for that job? We want to buy from sellers who are making mistakes.”
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Marks recalls the Nifty Fifty lost 95% over five years despite being the greatest companies in America.
market psychologynifty fifty“And if you bought the stocks the day I got to work in '69 and you held them for five years, the greatest companies in America, you lost about 95% of your money.”
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Marks states nothing is a good idea in the absence of price, lesson from Nifty Fifty experience.
market psychologyprice“But the lesson I learned from my experience with the nifty 50 in '69 was that it's not what you buy, it's what you pay that matters.”
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Marks observes a 17-year period without profound low points led people to forget leverage risks.
credit cycleleverage“And from March of o nine until, let's say, January '26, there generally were not profound low points. And when good times roll on that long, people forget about the possibility of bad times.”
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Marks doubts AI can pick the best managers because it requires intuition and subjective feel.
aihuman judgment“Because picking the best managers requires an intuition and a subjective feel that I would be surprised to learn that AI can be very good at.”
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Marks says defaults have not yet revealed who made bad loans but expects that to come.
credit cycledefaults“We actually haven't had many defaults yet, so we haven't had a chance yet to see who made bad loans. That's coming too. But I think that we were reserved in 2025.”
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Marks reports 99% of Oaktree's high yield bonds paid off but warns competition periodically erodes returns and safety.
credit cyclehigh yield“I think it's 99% of the high yield bonds we bought paid off. So, you know, there's nothing wrong with it fundamentally, intrinsically.”
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Marks argues AI makes the world more unpredictable than any time in his lifetime, challenging investment decision-making.
airisk“the changes that are underway today, and in particular the introduction of AI, render the world much less predictable than at any time, probably any time ever, and certainly any time in my lifetime.”
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Marks traces private credit's origins to 2011 when regulated banks withdrew from buyout lending and non-bank lenders filled the gap.
credit cyclemarket history“in 2011, when the banks chastened and regulated because of the global financial crisis, pulled back from lending for buyouts, so called non bank lenders stepped in and started to engage in direct lending, lending for mid sized buyouts.”
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Marks says private credit's yield advantage over public credit recently narrowed to just 125 basis points, eliminating its specialness.
market pricingprivate credit“It struck me that 125 basis points for a liquidity premium was about fair. It was probably adequate, but certainly not lush, and so, in my opinion, the specialness had gone away.”
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Marks notes worst loans are made in best times, citing seventeen years of good times since March 2009 bottom.
credit cyclemarket psychology“one of the long standing sayings in the banking business is that the worst of loans are made in the best of times, and it's for this reason.”
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Marks argues markets have enjoyed seventeen years without a truly tough period since March 2009, despite brief disruptions.
credit cyclemarket cycle“the stock market bottomed March 6, I think it was, of 2009, seventeen years ago, this month, and there hasn't really been a tough time in the financial market since then.”
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Marks says S&P prices doubled since September 2022 while intrinsic values have not.
market psychologyvaluation“since roughly 09/30/2022, I would venture that the S and P has doubled. I mean, company values haven't doubled, intrinsic values, but prices have doubled, so it's been a great time,”
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Marks notes the S&P 500 has doubled since September 2022 while intrinsic values have not, discouraging analysis.
market psychologyrisk“I mean, company values haven't doubled, intrinsic values, but prices have doubled, so it's been a great time, and great times encourage the desire to put money to work and discourage analysis,”
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Marks notes the global financial crisis produced only one year of elevated defaults instead of the normal two years.
credit cycledefaults“we've had seventeen years of low defaults, and the actions of the Fed made the global financial crisis, which was probably the most destructive environment I've ever lived through, have only one year of elevated defaults on high yield bonds rather than the normal two.”
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Marks notes the global financial crisis had only one year of elevated high yield defaults versus the normal two years.
credit cycledefaults“the global financial crisis, which was probably the most destructive environment I've ever lived through, have only one year of elevated defaults on high yield bonds rather than the normal two.”
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Marks observes yield spreads at low end of range indicate no fear or compensation for elevated defaults.
credit cyclemarket psychology“if the yield spreads are at the low end of normal range, you would have to say that the fear of elevated defaults is not present and compensation for an elevated default rate is not available.”
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Marks says optimism and credulousness dominate today's market, making excess returns harder to achieve.
market psychologyreturns“I think you would have to say, optimism, not pessimism, credulousness, not skepticism, are in the ascendancy today, and when optimism and credulousness are in the ascendancy, it gets hard to make return investments that will produce what we call excess returns,”
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Marks recalls nifty fifty stocks in 1969 where banks believed nothing could go wrong at any price.
market psychologyrisk“These were the 50 best and fastest growing companies in America, where nothing could go wrong and there was no price too high.”
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Marks says holding nifty fifty stocks for five years from September 1969 resulted in 95% losses.
market psychologyrisk“So if you bought the stocks the day I got there, I think it was 09/22/1969, if I'm not mistaken, and if you held them tenaciously for five years, the greatest company is America, you lost about 95% of your money.”
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Marks cites Block eliminating 40% of its workforce in one day as evidence most people underestimate AI's impact.
aiemployment“40% of the workforce gone in one day because AI could do the work cheaper and faster. So how many people in the world understand the potential import of that?”
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Marks notes OpenAI revealed their new model helped build itself, which he finds eye opening.
aitechnology“OpenAI brought out a new model. And in the descriptive materials, they said that the that the model helped build the model, which is really eye opening.”
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Marks says AI can eliminate a huge percentage of knowledge work, citing Block laying off 4,000 people.
aiemployment“Clearly, it can eliminate a a huge percentage of of knowledge work. And you we saw Friday block 10,000 employees, let 40%, 4,000 people let go”
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Marks says AI can eliminate a huge percentage of knowledge work, citing Block laying off 4,000 employees in one day.
aiemployment“And you we saw Friday block 10,000 employees, let 40%, 4,000 people let go in one go, who who aren't needed anymore because AI can do it better and cheaper and faster.”
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Marks expresses concern that AI moves faster than society can adjust, creating a formula for disruption.
aidisruption“So one of my concerns is that AI moves faster than the ability of society to adjust to it. And that and that is a formula for disruption.”
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Marks warns AI may move faster than society can adjust, creating a formula for disruption.
aimarket psychology“one of my concerns is that AI moves faster than the ability of society to adjust to it. And that and that is a formula for disruption.”
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Marks says if you think you know what will happen with AI, you don't understand what's going on.
aimarket psychology“I think it was Walter Cronkite who said if you're not confused, you don't know what's going on. I would say if you think you know what's gonna happen,”
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Marks argues anyone claiming to know AI's trajectory doesn't understand the situation; we're in the first inning.
aiprediction“I would say if you think you know what's gonna happen, you don't know understand what's going on. We're at the we're in the first inning of a very long unpredictable game.”
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Marks says if you think you know what will happen with AI, you don't understand what's going on.
aiprediction“I would say if you think you know what's gonna happen, you don't know understand what's going on.”
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Marks describes AI as the first inning of a long unpredictable game with unknown rules.
aimarket psychology“We're at the we're in the first inning of a very long unpredictable game. We don't know what the rules are or or have any idea how many innings there are”
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Marks says we're in the first inning of a very long unpredictable AI game with unknown rules.
ailong-term“We're at the we're in the first inning of a very long unpredictable game. We don't know what the rules are or or have any idea how many innings there are in the game.”
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Marks argues it's desirable to learn investment lessons early when there's not much money at stake.
learningmarket psychology“And so that was very informative and it's very desirable to learn your lessons early and also preferable to learn your lessons when there's not a lot of money at stake, which I did.”
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Marks admits his risk aversion was costly since 1980 when optimism consistently paid off.
credit cyclemarket psychology“And given the, if you think about it, from 1980 when the inflation was solved, essentially to date, generally speaking, the more optimistic you were, the more money you made.”
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Marks argues good investing is not just buying good things but buying things well at the right price.
investment philosophyrisk“it's not what you buy, it's what you pay. And good investing is not just a function of buying good things, but of buying things well.”
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Marks defines risk as the probability of an undesirable outcome, not volatility or fluctuation.
market psychologyrisk“Risk, in my opinion, and my view has evolved, risk is the probability negative outcome, of an undesirable outcome.”
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Marks defines risk as the probability of an undesirable outcome, not volatility.
market psychologyrisk“Risk, in my opinion, and my view has evolved, risk is the probability negative outcome, of an undesirable outcome. It is not the volatility of the stream.”
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Marks quotes Buffett preferring lumpy 15% returns over smooth 12% if you can survive volatility.
returnsrisk“And if you can survive long enough to enjoy the long term benefit of the lumpy 15, it beats the hell out of the smooth 12.”
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Marks explains risky assets must appear to offer high returns but do not have to deliver them.
market psychologyrisk“If a risky asset can be counted on to have a high return, then it's not risky. So it can't be true. It's incorrect on its face.”
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Marks explains risky assets must appear to offer high returns, but don't have to deliver them.
market psychologyreturns“What the relationship means is that an asset that appears to be risky has to appear to offer a high return or else nobody will buy it.”
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Marks describes personal borrowing rates falling from 22.25% in 1980 to 2.25% in 2020.
credit cycleinterest rates“And forty years later in 2020, I was able to borrow at two and a quarter fixed for fifteen years.”
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Marks's firm deployed $10 billion in fifteen weeks during the financial crisis after earlier caution.
credit cyclefinancial crisis“See, the lead up was that because we were worried in 'five and assets, we liquidated a lot of funds, if we raised funds, we raised only small funds, we increased our selectivity.”
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Marks notes the last three years rank among the top six in S&P 500 history.
market psychologyreturns“The S and P 500 stock index has been around for about a century. There have been ninety seven or ninety eight three year periods by definition.”
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Marks cites Thinking Machine Labs raising 2 billion dollars at 12 billion valuation without disclosing its product as bubble indicator.
ai bubblemarket psychology“And I say in the memo, for example, that some woman left OpenAI, started a company called Thinking Machine Labs, went out to raise money, and she said this company is going to engage in AI, but I can't tell you what we're going to do. It's a secret. And people gave her $2,000,000,000 for a sixth of the company.”
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Marks cites Thinking Machine Labs raising two billion dollars at twelve billion valuation without disclosing its product as bubble behavior.
aibubble“some woman left OpenAI, started a company called Thinking Machine Labs, went out to raise money, and she said this company is going to engage in AI, but I can't tell you what we're going to do. It's a secret. And people gave her $2,000,000,000 for a sixth of the company.”
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Marks argues tech companies' incremental profitability is enormous because virtual products have almost no marginal cost.
profitabilitytech“Their incremental profitability is enormous. When your product is virtual and you're selling one, you're making some money, you want to sell two, there's almost no cost in the second one.”
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Marks says 2023-2025 is the seventh best three-year period for the S&P 500 in a century, signaling elevated optimism.
market psychologyreturns“The period, twenty three four five is for the S and P 500 is, I think, the seventh best three year period out of the last 100. Seventh out of a 100.”
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Marks quotes Buffett: when others act less prudently, we must act more prudently in our own affairs.
contrarianprudence“Buffett says most things best. He says, the less prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own affairs.”
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Marks notes investors sell more when prices fall, opposite of normal behavior in every other walk of life.
contrarianhuman nature“In every other walk of life, we buy more when things go on sale. In the markets, we sell more when things go on sale.”
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Marks argues people's asymmetric response to gains versus losses warps their ability to bear necessary risk.
human natureloss aversion“Most people care a little about a dollar made and a lost. Exposing yourself to the risk of loss is integral in trying to have a good investment return.”
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Marks distinguishes risk control from risk avoidance, emphasizing intelligent risk-bearing is integral to good returns.
investment philosophypsychology“Exposing yourself to the risk of loss is integral in trying to have a good investment return. So, you know, even though our investment philosophy, stresses, risk control, we're not talking about risk avoidance.”
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Marks quotes Buffett preferring a lumpy 15% return over a smooth 12%, challenging excessive focus on volatility.
returnsrisk“And I would say to people, if you'd rather have a smooth 12 than a lumpy 15, you have to ask yourself what's going on.”
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Marks quotes Swensen saying good investing requires adopting uncomfortably idiosyncratic positions.
contrarianpositioning“Dave Swenson used my favorite two word phrase that good investing requires the adoption of uncomfortably idiosyncratic positions.”
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Marks says nobody can explain how AI will change the world, unlike the internet bubble where the vision was clearer.
aibubbles“I've never heard anybody tell me how AI is going to change the world. We know it's a powerful force. Can think, it can process data.”
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The Investor’s Podcast, 21 February 2026
bubblesinnovation“I always make this point that the bubbles are very, very around something new because the imagination is untrammed and it can go off in a flight of fancy.”
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Marks argues bubbles never form around prosaic industries like timber because outcomes are too predictable.
bubblesmarket psychology“You're never going to have a bubble in paper stocks or timber stocks. It's too prosaic. People can say, well, we can tell how many houses you're going to build.”
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Marks cites Buffett's point that productivity gains from internet and AI may not translate to profitability, now applied to AI.
aiproductivity“There's no doubt that the internet will produce a great increase in productivity. It's not clear that it'll have a positive impact on profitability. And I think the same is true of AI.”
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Marks quotes Buffett distinguishing productivity gains from profitability in technology like internet and AI.
aiproductivity“There's no doubt that the internet will produce a great increase in productivity. It's not clear that it'll have a positive impact on profitability.”
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Marks notes AI could eliminate half of entry level jobs but questions whether productivity gains translate to profitability.
aiemployment“You say that AI has the ability to eliminate half of entry level jobs. That was the whole conversation because then they cut to something else. But the point is that may be true.”
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Marks notes CNN reported AI could eliminate half of entry level jobs while maintaining US GDP, raising profitability questions.
aiemployment“And obviously if you can produce The US GDP and eliminate half the entry level jobs, it could be more profitable or certainly more productive.”
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Marks questions whether AI savings will accrue as profits or be competed away through lower prices.
aicompetition“To whom will the savings accrue? If different companies are competing to provide the AI service, maybe they'll compete on price to the point where it's not profitable for them.”
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Marks suggests AI savings may accrue to consumers through price competition rather than to company profits.
aicompetition“If different companies are competing to provide the AI service, maybe they'll compete on price to the point where it's not profitable for them.”
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Marks frames the AI investment choice as binary moonshot bets versus incremental gains in established tech companies.
aiinvestment strategy“Or do you want to invest in a great tech company, which is already existing and making a lot of money where AI could be incremental, but not life changing?”
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Marks cites Dimson saying the future is a probability distribution, not a single outcome that can be predicted.
forecastingrisk“The future is not a set single thing that if you're smart enough, you can figure it out what it's going to be and it's going to materialize and make you right.”
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Marks argues the future is a probability distribution of possibilities, not a single predictable outcome.
forecastingrisk“It's a probability distribution. It's a range of possibilities in each thing, whether it's GDP growth next year or inflation next year, or who's going to win the next election,”
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Marks cites math where consistently staying between 27th and 47th percentile for fourteen years produced overall fourth percentile performance.
compoundingperformance“So solidly in the second quarter for fourteen years in a row. But interestingly, as a result, for the fourteen years overall, they were in the fourth percentile.”
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The Investor’s Podcast, 13 December 2025
defensive investingmarket psychology“And the answer turns out to be that most investors, shoot for the stars and occasionally shoot themselves in the foot and wreck their record.”
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Marks explains that most investors wreck their records by occasional big losses that take years to recover from.
investor behaviorlosses“most investors, shoot for the stars and occasionally shoot themselves in the foot and wreck their record. And once you have a big loss, it takes a long time to get back to scratch.”
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Marks states if you avoid losers in equities, winners will take care of themselves, his core motto.
investment philosophyoaktree“And it happens to say in there, simply put what the pension funds record tells me is that in equities, if you can avoid the losers and losing years, the winners will take care of themselves.”
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Marks adopted if you avoid the losers, the winners take care of themselves as Oaktree's founding motto in 1995.
investing philosophyoaktree“in equities, if you can avoid the losers and losing years, the winners will take care of themselves.”
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The Investor’s Podcast, 13 December 2025
investment philosophyoaktree“And when we started Oaktree in 1995, I wrote that down, and that became our motto and still is.”
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Marks explains that in high yield bonds, identifying which bonds to avoid matters more than which to buy.
credithigh yield“if there are a 100 high yield bonds out there and they're all 8% bonds, and you know that 90 will pay and 10 will default, it doesn't matter which of the 90 that pay you buy because they're all 8% bonds, they all get the same return.”
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The Investor’s Podcast, 13 December 2025
frequencymarket timing“What if I said, every four days I got either say buy or sell? I think that my record would be fifty fifty at best.”
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Marks says Oaktree had raised $10 billion for distressed debt by September 2008, three times the prior record.
2008 crisiscredit cycle“When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in mid September of o eight, we had raised the biggest distressed debt fund in history by a factor of about three. We had $10,000,000,000 sitting on the shelf.”
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Marks reveals Oaktree raised ten billion dollars for distressed debt before Lehman collapsed, three times larger than any prior fund.
2008crisis investing“When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in mid September of o eight, we had raised the biggest distressed debt fund in history by a factor of about three.”
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Marks says Oaktree had $10 billion ready when Lehman collapsed and most thought the financial world would melt down.
2008 crisiscredit cycle“We had $10,000,000,000 sitting on the shelf. Lehman goes under. Most people think the financial world is gonna melt down. Question is whether you spend the money.”
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Marks reveals Bruce Karsh invested $450 million per week for fifteen weeks during the 2008 crisis.
2008 crisiscontrarian“Bruce and I figured out that we should spend the money. He ran the fund in question and he bravely invested an average of $450,000,000 a week for the next fifteen weeks.”
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Marks deployed seven billion dollars in Q4 2008 at 450 million per week for fifteen weeks after Lehman's collapse.
2008crisis investing“He ran the fund in question and he bravely invested an average of $450,000,000 a week for the next fifteen weeks. That's $7,000,000,000 in one quarter.”
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Marks cites Buffett's distinction that productivity gains from Internet and AI may not translate to profitability.
aiprofitability“There's no doubt that the Internet will produce a great increase in productivity. It's not clear that it'll have a positive impact on profitability. And I think the same is true of AI.”
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Marks questions whether AI eliminating half of entry-level jobs will translate into profits or just lower consumer prices.
aimarket psychology“if you can produce The US GDP and eliminate half the entry level jobs, it could be more profitable or certainly more productive. But the question is, will it be more profitable?”
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Marks notes gold returned 7.7% annually since 2010 versus 12.7% for S&P 500 over the same period.
asset allocationgold“And if you bought the S and P at the same time, you've had a 12.7% rate of return.”
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Marks is certain AI will irreversibly change society but questions whether its implementation will prove excessive in scope and financing.
aibubbles“And the question is, will the implementation prove to have been excessive in scope and in in the way it's financed?”
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Marks argues lending to high-risk activities creates unlimited downside with limited upside, making it the wrong risk-reward combination.
lendingprivate credit“You certainly shouldn't do that in in in activities that have a high probability of not paying off at all because then you have unlimited downside and limited upside.”
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Marks cites Buffett's principle that investor imprudence requires greater personal prudence and should signal worry.
buffettmarket psychology“Buffett says, the less prudence with which others conduct our affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own affairs.”
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Marks characterizes Fed interventions as price controls that induce excessive risk-taking when money is artificially cheap.
fed policymarket psychology“And the Fed manipulations are a form of price controls. You know, they control the price of money. And if Fed puts money artificially cheap, then it induces behavior like risk taking.”
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Marks calls Fed rate setting a form of price controls that forces investors into riskier activities.
fed policymarket psychology“And the Fed manipulations are a form of price controls. You know, they control the price of money.”
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Marks argues artificially cheap Fed money forces investors into riskier activities when safe returns are too low.
fed policymarket psychology“And if Fed puts money artificially cheap, then it induces behavior like risk taking. It forces people into riskier activities because the returns on safe activities are so low.”
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Marks says S&P valuation suggests very low single-digit returns over the next ten years based on historical PE ratios.
market valuationreturns“Historically, if you bought at this PE ratio, your return over the next ten years averaged in the very low single digits.”
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Marks argues job losses from automation and offshoring coincided with the opiate epidemic in both amount and geographic location.
aijobs“And as I said in the addendum, When we lost jobs to automation and offshoring, I think that that coincided with the opiate epidemic and not only in amount but also in location.”
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Marks links job losses from automation and offshoring to the opiate epidemic by amount and location.
ai impactautomation“When we lost jobs to automation and offshoring, I think that that coincided with the opiate epidemic and not only in amount but also in location.”
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Marks worries that replacing income from lost jobs cannot address purposelessness since jobs provide more than paychecks.
ai impactjobs“And I think it's a natural consequence of people sitting around all day. And even if we if we can find a way to replace their income I worry about purposelessness and you know we get so much job so much from our jobs other than a paycheck and you can't replace that stuff.”
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Marks worries that replacing income alone won't solve purposelessness problem from job losses to AI.
ai impactpurposelessness“And even if we if we can find a way to replace their income I worry about purposelessness and you know we get so much job so much from our jobs other than a paycheck and you can't replace that stuff.”
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Marks defines bubbles primarily as psychological excess where no price seems too high.
bubblesmarket psychology“To me, the main ingredient in bubbles is psychological excess. There's no such thing as a price too high.”
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Marks says current AI frenzy has not reached bubble-level mania yet.
aibubbles“And I don't detect that level of mania at this time, so I have not put the bubble label Right.”
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Marks says he has not labeled current AI frenzy a bubble because mania has not reached critical level.
aibubbles“And I don't detect that level of mania at this time, so I have not put the bubble label Right. On this on this incident.”
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Marks says AI will change the world and has been successful, with investors piling in.
aiinvestment“I think there's relatively little doubt that AI will change the world. And AI has been successful as an investment, and people are piling in,”
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Marks says AI will change the world and has been successful, with investors piling in amid FOMO.
aifomo“I think there's relatively little doubt that AI will change the world. And AI has been successful as an investment, and people are piling in, and there's some fear about being left out.”
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Marks judges that AI investing has not reached the critical mass of mania needed for a bubble.
aibubbles“But to me, it just hasn't this is a judgment call. And to me, it just hasn't reached that critical mass of mania.”
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Marks explains the strong form of efficient market hypothesis claims you cannot beat the market.
efficient marketsinvestment theory“the efficient market hypothesis posits that because of the concerted action of investors, prices converge with fair value, everything is priced right, and you can't beat the market.”
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Marks qualifies the efficient market hypothesis, saying beating the market is hard but possible for a few.
efficient market hypothesismarket theory“the efficient market hypothesis says you can't beat the market. And what I would say is it's not that you can't beat the market, but it's hard. And rather few people can do it.”
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Marks states most equity mutual funds underperform the S&P 500 even before fees.
indexingmutual funds“if you look at equity mutual funds, most equity mutual funds don't even do as well as the S and P five hundred before fees,”
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Marks warns that assuming you are smart and others are dumb is a major investing mistake.
humilitymarket psychology“One of the biggest mistakes you can make in life, but especially in investing, is to assume that you're smart and everybody else is dumb.”
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Marks argues that if risky investments guaranteed higher returns, they would not be risky by definition.
investment theoryreturn“if riskier investments could be counted on to produce higher returns, then by definition, they're not risky. So that can't be right.”
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Marks explains why the claim that riskier investments have higher returns is logically incoherent.
market theoryrisk“if it were true that taking more risk is the surefire path to a higher return, then it wouldn't be risky. Can't be right. So I was always unsatisfied with that.”
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Marks clarifies that risky assets must appear to offer higher returns to attract investors, not guarantee them.
expected returnreturn“assets that are expected to be riskier have to appear to offer a higher return or nobody will make those investments. That makes a 100% sense, doesn't it?”
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Marks clarifies that risky assets must appear to offer higher returns, not that they deliver them.
market theoryreturn“assets that are expected to be riskier have to appear to offer a higher return or nobody will make those investments. That makes a 100% sense, doesn't it? So that's what this relationship means”
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Marks states that 99% of startups and 90% of venture capital investments fail despite high return potential.
riskstatistics“something like probably 99% of all startups fail, probably something like 90% of all the investments that venture capital funds make fail.”
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Marks says beating competitors requires either more winners or fewer losers, rarely both simultaneously.
investment strategymarket psychology“I can have more of the things that go up a lot than you do or less of the things that go down a lot than you do.”
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Marks says investor psychology swings from flawless to hopeless while reality fluctuates more moderately.
cyclesmarket psychology“in real life things fluctuate between pretty good and not so hot but in the minds of investors, they go from flawless to hopeless.”
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Marks defines market cycles as excesses and corrections rather than simple ups and downs.
cyclesmarket theory“The way to think of of a pattern of of cycle is excesses and corrections. So so for example, let's look here. What's happening here?”
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Marks blames social media and TV for encouraging rapid market fluctuations and short-term trading.
short-termismsocial media“you watch the shows on TV and you get somebody on who says, you should buy and some people buy and then the next guest says you should sell and things go like this.”
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Marks notes that while the internet transformed society, 99% of internet stocks from 1999 are worthless.
bubblesmarket psychology“Can you imagine the world today without the internet? And yet I imagine that 99% of the internet stocks that came out are worthless today.”
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Marks cites JPMorgan chart showing negative correlation between S&P 500 PE ratios and subsequent ten-year returns.
forecastingmarket valuation“And it was a negative correlation, which means the higher the PE ratio you pay, the lower the return you should expect.”
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Marks warns that at PE ratio of 23, historical S&P returns over next decade were always between 2% and -2%.
market psychologyrisk“And it showed that historically, you bought the S and P when the PE ratio was 23, in every case, there were no exceptions.”
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Marks notes high yield bonds currently offer 7-8% yields, close to historical equity returns with different tax treatment.
alternativescredit“So today you can buy high yield bonds, whether it be The US or Europe or variations on that theme, what we call low grade credit.”
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Marks shares trader's wisdom that when it's time to buy, psychological conditions make you not want to.
behavioral financecontrarian“I came across a great quote within the last year from a guy who's a retired trader, When the time comes to buy, you won't want to.”
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My First Million, 22 August 2025
market psychologyrisk“The only thing I'm sure of is if you zig when they zig, you're not gonna outperform.”
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Marks detected excessive risk-taking in 2005-06 by observing low-quality deals getting done easily, signaling inadequate prudence.
credit cyclemarket psychology“I'd say, look at this piece of junk that got issued yesterday. There's something wrong. If a deal like this can get done, the world is exercising inadequate prudence.”
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Marks raised $8 billion in early 2007, took only $3.5 billion, held rest in standby fund.
credit cyclerisk“But we would like to have the remainder of your interest in a standby fund that will implement if the stuff hits the fan.”
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My First Million, 22 August 2025
crisis investingdecision-making“But if I don't invest it and the world doesn't melt down, then we didn't do our job. QED, you have to move forward.”
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Marks deployed $450 million weekly for fifteen weeks during financial crisis, $650 million weekly across all Oaktree funds.
crisis investingdeployment“So as you say, we invested $450,000,000 a week for the next fifteen weeks in that fund, which was 7,000,000,000 and Oaktree overall invested an average of $650,000,000 a week for the next fifteen weeks.”
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Marks argues academics adopted volatility as the risk measure largely because it was quantifiable, not because it was accurate.
academic theorymarket psychology“The academics developing investment theory, largely at the University of Chicago in the early sixties, just a couple years before I got there, adopted volatility as their measure of risk.”
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Marks argues academics chose volatility as risk measure because it was quantifiable, not because it was accurate.
academic theoryrisk“I think that volatility can be an indicator of the presence of risk, a symptom if you will, but it's not risk itself.”
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Marks defines risk as the probability of loss, not volatility as academics measure it.
market psychologyrisk“So if risk is not volatility, then what is it? And in my opinion, and in the real world sense, risk is the probability of loss.”
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Marks says buying at highs and holding through declines eventually recovers as new highs exceed old highs.
market psychologyrisk“The fact that you experienced a downward fluctuation might have been uncomfortable for a little while. But by the time the new high is achieved, you're you're you're back to to your cost and more.”
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Marks quotes Rick Kane saying everything interesting in finance happened outside two standard deviations, not within them.
market psychologyrisk“My friend Rick Kane once said that 96% of financial history has occurred within two standard deviations, but everything interesting has happened outside of two standard deviations.”
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Marks asserts risk is not a function of asset quality, opposing conventional belief about quality and safety.
credit cyclerisk“One of the most important things for every investor to learn is that risk is not a function of asset quality. This too sounds counterintuitive.”
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Marks argues investment success comes from buying things well, not buying good things, as any asset can become overpriced.
market psychologyrisk“My conclusion was it's not what you buy, it's what you pay. And investment success doesn't come from buying good things, but from buying things well.”
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Marks argues no asset is so good it cannot be overpriced or so bad it cannot become attractively cheap.
market psychologyrisk“There are no assets that are so good that they can't become overpriced and dangerous. There are very few assets that are so bad that they can't be cheap enough to be attractive as investments.”
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Marks refutes the idea that riskier assets produce higher returns, arguing they only offer higher expected returns to induce participation.
market psychologyrisk“Very simply, if it were true that riskier assets produce higher returns, then they wouldn't be riskier, would they? So that can't be the right explanation.”
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Marks says risky assets must offer higher expected returns to attract investors, but do not have to deliver them.
market psychologyrisk“What the upward sloping line, the positive correlation, means is that investments that are perceived as being risky have to be perceived as offering higher returns to induce people to make those investments.”
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Marks argues imprecise expert judgment about loss probability beats precise but irrelevant volatility numbers.
market psychologyrisk“I believe imprecise qualitative expert opinion about the probability of loss is far more useful than precise but largely irrelevant numbers concerning past and projected volatility.”
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Marks argues risk control should follow soccer's continuous play model, not American football's discrete offense-defense switches.
market psychologyrisk“I think the right model for thinking about whether we need risk control isn't American football, it's soccer. In American football, the team with the ball has the offense on the field.”
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Marks says output quality is the one thing within your control when randomness governs so much else.
advicecontrol“One thing within your control is the quality of your output. Amen. You should have a simple goal to put out a product which is the highest quality you can.”
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Marks believes most readers cannot implement his concepts even after understanding them, so sharing carries no competitive risk.
implementationknowledge“Well, I really believe that I can tell people what's important, but most of them are still not gonna be able to do it.”
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Marks says sharing investment wisdom poses little risk because most people cannot implement the concepts even if they know them.
implementationknowledge“So I'm not putting myself at risk, because some people are gonna say, well, that's what he says. I'm not into that.”
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Marks describes his first viral moment when a 1990s memo reached Russia within hours unexpectedly.
distributionhistory“I'll never forget the time in the late nineties when I put out a memo, and within an hour or two, I had a, response back from somebody in Russia.”
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Marks reports growing his memo distribution from 100 readers in 1990 to 300,000 subscribers today.
distributiongrowth“So, you know, from probably a 100 or so in 1990, I think now we're up to 300,000 subscribers and hopefully they pass it around.”
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Marks says his memo distribution has grown from 100 clients to 300,000 subscribers over decades.
distributionmemos“I think now we're up to 300,000 subscribers and hopefully they pass it around. And and so it's it's a lot of fun now and I get great responses and I enjoy it.”
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Marks criticizes daily market commentary writers who predict the future and are only right half the time on average.
forecastingmarket psychology“And if if they ever kept a scorecard on the things that they wrote about what's gonna happen tomorrow, they would see that on average they get it right half the time”
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Marks defines real investment accomplishment as making money with controlled risk, not just returns.
investment philosophyreturns“To me, the real accomplishment is making money with the risk under control. And that's what thinking about risk, I think, helps you do.”
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Marks describes Fed funds rate declining from 20% in 1980 to zero forty years later as dominant financial factor.
credit cycleinterest rates“Forty years later, the Fed funds rate was zero, and I had a loan outstanding from bank at two and a quarter.”
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Marks says interest rates fell 20 percentage points from 1980 to 2020, the most important financial event in fifty years.
credit cycleinterest rates“So the decline of interest rates by 20 percentage points over that period was a dominant factor in the financial world.”
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Marks forecasts Fed funds rate will settle between two and four percent, not zero to two.
forecastinterest rates“what I said in the memo is that rates are likely to be between two and four, not between zero and two, the Fed funds rate.”
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Marks says the Fed funds rate should exceed inflation to maintain a positive real rate.
credit cyclefed policy“If inflation's two, then the Fed funds rate should be higher than that so that there's a positive real Fed funds rate.”
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Marks says few recognize the shift in interest rates as a major change despite his emphasis.
credit cyclemarket psychology“Some people come up to me and say, yes. You're right. Interest rates are are low. Nobody has said this is a major change as you say it is.”
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Marks says credit instruments now offer equity-type returns with high single to low double digit yields.
investment strategyprivate credit“Today, you can get equity type returns from what we call credit instruments, loans, corporate corporate loans, loans for buyouts.”
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Marks illustrates how refinancing environment shifted from 800 million at 5% to 500 million at 8%.
credit cycleinterest rates“You went to the bank. They said we'll lend you 800,000,000 at 5%. Now the loan is up for renewal. You go in. They say, fine. We'll lend you 500,000,000 at 8%.”
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Marks says great investors are right only 60-80% of the time; those needing certainty should avoid investing.
expectationsinvesting philosophy“The great investors are right 60%, 70%, maybe 80% of the time. If you're the kind of person who has to be right all the time, you shouldn't be in in investing.”
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Marks argues security prices depend on people's reactions to events, not the events themselves.
behavioral financemarket psychology“it's not just whether the event was positive, it's how people reacted to the event that determines the impact on the security prices.”
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Marks says when any company can raise money on any basis, that's a danger signal in the market.
credit cyclemarket psychology“I'd hold up an article from the news, I said, Look at this piece of crap that got issued yesterday. If a company can raise money on this basis, there's something wrong in the market.”
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Marks says when any company can raise money on any terms, the market has failed its disciplinary function.
bubble warningcredit cycle“If a company can raise money on this basis, there's something wrong in the market. It's as simple as that, you know?”
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Marks explains Oaktree's logic for buying during the Lehman crisis: if the system melts down, nothing matters anyway.
crisis investingmarket psychology“Either the financial system is going to melt down or it's not. If it melts down, it doesn't matter whether we bought or not, because it's, you know, it's game over for everything.”
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Marks raised $11 billion in reserve in early 2007, didn't deploy it until June 2008.
2008capital raising“The first closing was March o seven. We didn't start investing it until June o eight.”
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Marks says he's made only five to seven market calls in fifty years, when prices reached absurd extremes.
careerdiscipline“And when prices are at absurd extremes, the case, the logic for a market call is very strong, and the probability of being right is very high.”
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Marks argues bubbles exist because overpriced markets can become more overpriced before eventually reverting.
bubblesmarket psychology“And if it were true that every overpriced markets reverts and becomes fairly priced, then we would never get a bubble because they would stop going up here.”
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Marks quotes Swensen saying successful investing requires uncomfortably idiosyncratic positions against the crowd.
contrarianmarket psychology“successful investing requires the adoption of uncomfortably idiosyncratic positions. Everybody has the same influences, everybody thinks pretty much the same,”
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Marks quotes Swenson that successful investing requires uncomfortably idiosyncratic positions; tomorrow's winners are today's losers.
contrarianmarket psychology“Everybody has the same influences, everybody thinks pretty much the same, everybody anoints the same winners and criticizes the same losers, and obviously tomorrow's winners are usually found on the pile of today's losers,”
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Marks advocates cutting off the bottom tail rather than shooting for the top tail to achieve best long-term performance.
performancerisk management“Approach is very simple, cut off the bottom tail. That's what this guy in the Midwest did.”
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Marks argues risk cannot be quantified even after the fact, using a doubling investment as example.
investment philosophyquantification“Or was it a really clever thing that nobody else had figured out where you were sure to double your money? And the answer is you can't tell.”
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Marks says readily available quantitative data cannot make you superior because everyone has the same information.
dataedge“readily available quantitative information about the present can't help you be superior as an investor, or it's not sufficient to be superior.”
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Marks argues readily available quantitative data cannot make you superior because everyone has access to it.
competitive advantagedata“You have to understand that and process it, but it's not enough because everybody else has it readily available and it's quantitative, so everybody can process it.”
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Marks says computers cannot identify the next Steve Jobs or Amazon because these require subjective future judgments.
artificial intelligencejudgment“I don't think it can look at five business plans and figure out which is the next Amazon. These are subjective judgments about the future, not based on past data.”
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Marks argues computers cannot identify the next Steve Jobs or Amazon through subjective future judgments.
aijudgment“I don't think it can look at five business plans and figure out which is the next Amazon. These are subjective judgments about the future,”
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Marks argues that average returns with below-average risk are a great accomplishment but easily overlooked because only returns are visible.
market psychologyperformance measurement“I believe that achieving an average return with below average risk is an equally significant accomplish, but easily overlooked because only the risk is evident, only the return is evident.”
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Marks argues average returns with below-average risk are equally significant but overlooked because only returns are visible.
asymmetryperformance“achieving an average return with below average risk is an equally significant accomplish, but easily overlooked because only the risk is evident, only the return is evident.”
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Wharton School, 2 May 2022
academic theoryrisk“I think that one of the things you're taught here is that volatility is a measure of risk. Volatility is risk.”
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Marks invokes Einstein's quote that not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts.
measurementphilosophy“Einstein, there's a great quote from Einstein, who said that not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts.”
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Marks states risk cannot be quantified in advance and historical volatility is not a good risk indicator.
measurementrisk“risk is unquantifiable in advance. You can make reference to the historical volatility, the historical standard deviation, but number one, that's not a very good indicator of risk.”
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Marks argues that risk cannot be quantified even after the fact, citing an example of a doubled investment.
measurementphilosophy“You buy something for 100. A year later, sell it for 200. Was it risky? You can't tell. Even when it's over, you can't tell.”
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Wharton School, 2 May 2022
market psychologyrisk“Even when it's over, you can't tell. Was that a safe investment that it was sure to produce a double? Or was it a risky investment where you got lucky?”
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Marks contends that the belief that there's no risk is itself the riskiest thing because it drives risky behavior.
behavioral financemarket psychology“I believe that the riskiest thing in the world is the belief that there's no risk.”
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Marks argues the belief that there is no risk is the riskiest thing because it encourages dangerous behavior.
crisismarket psychology“the riskiest thing in the world is the belief that there's no risk. Because when police when people believe there's no risk, they act in very risky ways, which makes the world a risky place.”
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Marks argues risk is hidden because it only becomes visible when negative events occur, like flaws exposed by earthquakes.
market cyclesportfolio management“I also believe that risk is hidden and deceptive. This is really important. Loss is what happens when risk, the potential for loss collides with negative events.”
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Marks says high-quality assets can be risky if overpriced, citing nifty-fifty stocks that lost almost everything from 1969 to 1974.
market historyrisk“A high quality asset can be priced so high that it's risky. I started work at Citibank in September 1969, when I got out of Chicago Booth.”
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Wharton School, 2 May 2022
market historyrisk“And if you bought those stocks, the day I got there in '69, and you held them firmly for five years, you lost almost all your money.”
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Marks states good investing is not buying good things but buying things well; price determines risk.
philosophyprice“it's not what you buy, it's what you pay that determines whether your investment is risky or not. B, that good investing is not a matter of buying good things, but buying things well.”
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Marks challenges the risk-return line saying if higher returns are certain from risky assets, they aren't risky.
academicrisk“if you can count on higher returns from a risky asset, then by definition, it's not risky. So it's kind of an oxymoron. And I was never comfortable with this graphic.”
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Marks says Oaktree deployed ten billion dollars in fifteen weeks after Lehman collapsed, averaging 650 million per week.
credit cyclecrisis investing“after the global financial crisis, some people thought it represented an existential threat, we swung into action and we were able to invest $650,000,000 a week on average for fifteen weeks between Lehman's September 15 bankruptcy and the end of the year, that's $10,000,000,000”
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Marks identifies it's different this time as the four worst words in the world for investors.
contrarianismcycles“If you say to them, you know, well that happened twenty and forty years ago and it ended badly, what they say is they use the four worst words in the world.”
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Marks argues good investing is not buying good things but buying things well.
high-yield bondsinvestment philosophy“And there's a really important lesson in that, that good investing is not a matter of buying good things, but buying things well.”
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Marks quotes Feynman that physics would be harder if electrons had feelings, unlike human investors.
human naturemarket behavior“Richard Feynman, the great physicist, said that, physics would be much harder if electrons had feelings. We walk in the room, we turn on the light switch, the lights go on every time.”
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Marks argues understanding psychology's ebb and flow is crucial to improving upon buy-and-hold investing.
investing philosophymarket psychology“I think that if you want to exist in the investment world and you want to, you can just buy and hold good things if you want to take that approach, But if you want to improve upon that, I think it's very important to understand the ebb and flow of psychology and act accordingly.”
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Marks defines exceptional investors as those achieving good returns disproportionate to risk taken.
investing philosophyrisk“I think that an exceptional investor is someone who has a good return disproportionate to the risk born. A good return with the risk under control.”
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Marks deployed ten billion dollars in fifteen weeks during late 2008 crisis when nerve mattered most.
2008 crisiscontrarianism“So at Oaktree, we invested $650,000,000 a week in the last fifteen weeks of 'eight, that's about $10,000,000,000 and that's really all you had to do.”
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Marks argues that at cycle extremes investors need money and nerve to spend it, not selectivity.
market cyclemarket psychology“you don't need conservatism, caution, risk control, discipline, patience or selectivity. You need money and the nerve to spend it.”
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Marks argues the key insight is that any asset can be good at the right price.
high yieldinvesting philosophy“the big realization of the last ten, forty years is that just about every asset can get cheap enough so that it's a good investment, and most investments can get so expensive that they're a bad investment. And the revolution of the high yield bond industry was really to say,”
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Marks identifies too much money chasing too few deals as the seven worst words in investing.
cyclesmarket psychology“Now remember, the four worst words in the world were, it's different this time, the seven worst words in the world are too much money chasing too few deals.”
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Marks argues outcomes cannot determine decision quality because randomness causes good decisions to fail and bad ones to succeed.
market psychologyrandomness“you can't tell from an outcome whether a decision was good or bad. It's very important. Most people don't understand this. Totally counterintuitive.”
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Marks says good decisions fail and bad decisions succeed frequently due to randomness in investing.
market psychologyrandomness“good decisions fail to work all the time. Bad decisions work all the time. The investment business is full of people who are, quote, right for the wrong reason.”
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Marks argues investors must not assume likely outcomes will occur, unlike in physical sciences where determinism applies.
market psychologyrisk“you should not act as if the things that should happen are the things that will happen. Again, in the world of the physical sciences, you can probably bet that that's true.”
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Marks cites definition that risk means more things can happen than will happen.
market psychologyrisk“There's a professor at the London Business School who put it succinctly. He said risk means more things can happen than will happen. And again, this is profound in my opinion.”
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Marks quotes London Business School professor defining risk as more outcomes being possible than will actually occur.
market psychologyrisk“risk means more things can happen than will happen. And again, this is profound in my opinion. In the economic world, people generally make their decisions based on something called expected value,”
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Marks states the secret to investing is buying assets for less than intrinsic worth, not buying quality.
market psychologyrisk“So if you buy a high quality asset and I say in the book, there's a guy on the radio when I lived in LA,”
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Marks cites buying America's best companies from 1968 to 1973 lost 90% due to overpricing.
market psychologyrisk“if you bought the bonds of Hewlett Packard, PerkinElmer, Texas Instruments, Merck, Lilly, Xerox, IBM, Kodak, Polaroid, AIG, Coca Cola, and Procter and Gamble, and if you bought them all in 'sixty eight and you held them until 'seventy three, you lost 90% of your money. Why? Because they were overpriced.”
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Marks recounts losing 90% buying America's best companies 1968-73 because they were overpriced at 80-90 times earnings.
credit cyclemarket psychology“if you bought the bonds of Hewlett Packard, PerkinElmer, Texas Instruments, Merck, Lilly, Xerox, IBM, Kodak, Polaroid, AIG, Coca Cola, and Procter and Gamble, and if you bought them all in 'sixty eight and you held them until 'seventy three, you lost 90% of your money.”
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Marks describes investing in best companies lost 90% while worst companies made most money.
credit cyclemarket psychology“Then you go to the high yield bond business, you invest in the worst companies in America, you make the most money.”
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Marks explains bonds as fixed promises where all paying bonds deliver identical returns.
credit cycleprivate credit“You give me $100 and I promise to give you 5% interest every year and then give you a bonding back in twenty years. Fixed income, it's called, because all the events are fixed.”
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Marks explains bonds as fixed contracts where all returns are identical if promises are kept.
credit cycleprivate credit“Fixed income, it's called, because all the events are fixed. The contract is fixed. The return is fixed, assuming the promise is kept.”
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Marks reveals fund averaging 37th percentile yearly ranked fourth over fourteen years because managers blow up spectacularly.
market psychologyrisk“What percentile do you think that fund was in for the whole fourteen years? Four. Four. And if you think about it, it's really almost mysterious. Why the fourth, not the thirty seventh?”
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Marks launched the first distressed debt fund in 1988, investing in bonds already in default.
credit cycleprivate credit“in 'eighty eight, we brought out the first distressed debt fund. Now we're not investing in companies that have a risk of default.”
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Marks launched the first distressed debt fund in 1988, investing in bonds of bankrupt or near-bankrupt companies.
credit cycleprivate credit“we brought out the first distressed debt fund. Now we're not investing in companies that have a risk of default. We're investing in bonds that are either in default or sure to be.”
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Marks reports Oaktree made 23% annually for 28 years in distressed debt without leverage.
credit cycleprivate credit“And we've made about 23% a year for twenty eight years investing in distressed debt before fees without any leverage. So that's pretty astronomical. Why?”
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Marks reports 23% annual returns for 28 years in distressed debt without leverage by buying below intrinsic value.
credit cycleprivate credit“we've made about 23% a year for twenty eight years investing in distressed debt before fees without any leverage. So that's pretty astronomical. Why?”
Posts 1 post
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post Marks announces Brookfield's completed acquisition of Oaktree after seven years of partnership
https://x.com/HowardMarksBook/status/2084294512516436132
Reported 8 quotes
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reported
Crisis psychology collapses the distinction between what's possible and what's probable.
“During the crisis, any optimistic scenario was dismissed as naive. Everything bad seemed possible, and therefore probable. The distinction between possibility and probability vanished. That’s the real psychological poison in markets.”
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reported
His team bought at market lows because geographic distance from New York prevented emotional contagion.
“Our team was able to buy at the market’s lows because they weren’t in New York, where everyone was sharing horror stories and depressing each other.”
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reported
Marks argues investors should tailor strategy to whether they fear losing money or missing opportunities, and says research advantage is hard to gain since many smart people already do it.
“ [ 4 ] Marks focuses on risk management and says that investors should set investment strategy according to their personal situations and ask themselves whether they worry more about the risk of losing money or the risk of missing an opportunity. [ 4 ] Marks believes that it is hard to gain an investment advantage through research since so many smart people are doing it already; the ways to get an advantage are through better inferring the consequences implied by current company data, managing the psychology of investing, and assessing the present stage of the business / market cycle. He hopes to have average returns during a bull market , while minimizing losses during bear markets due to his belief that losses do more harm than any benefit investors obtain from gains. Marks does favor using market timing strategies to have cash available to be invested during a downturn. [ 5 ] Marks notes that it is important for investors to admit what they don't know instead of believing something is certain. He aims for a ”
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reported
Other investors' emotions become advantage or threat depending on your emotional discipline.
“Other investors’ emotional swings can be a threat… or a competitive advantage. What determines which one it is, is your ability to keep a cool head.”
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reported
None of their investments became massive successes like Uber.
“we did not have any of them become the next Uber or something massive,”
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reported
Understanding current cycle position matters more than forecasting for investment success.
“If you want to succeed in the markets, you don’t need to predict the future. What you need is a solid understanding of where we stand today in the cycle. That alone gives you a considerable edge.”
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reported
Markets oscillate between extremes of sentiment that drive prices away from fair value.
“The pendulum of financial markets swings constantly between euphoria and depression, between celebrating good news and obsessing over bad news, and therefore between overvaluation and undervaluation.”
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reported
Warren Buffett endorses Marks's investment memos and books.
“, are widely admired in the investment community. They detail his investment strategies and insight into the economy and are posted publicly on the Oaktree website. He has also published 3 books on investing. [ 2 ] [ 3 ] According to Warren Buffett , ”
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