On the record about
5 people · 33 quotes · 14 Dec 2012 to 8 Jul 2026
3 of 5 lanes rest on fewer than 5 quotes and are marked thin. Offsets are days from the middle first-quote date, 30 Jun 2022 — a date, and nothing else. It is not a claim about who reached a view first.
Gurley calls late-stage private market of past two years the most reckless investment behavior since the bubble.
“I think if you look back, could say over the past two years, the most reckless investment behavior we've seen since the bubble was the late stage private market of the past two years.”
Gurley says late-stage private market is the frothiest since the late '90s despite down IPOs.
“I would say on a couple of fronts, the late stage private market continues to be the most frothy thing I've seen since the late '90s.”
Gurley says capital available to late stage private companies is unbelievable with behavior reminiscent of the late nineties.
“the amount of dollars available to successful late stage private companies is unbelievable. And the behavior that you'll see for the competition in those dollars is very reminiscent of the late 90s.”
Gurley says late-stage private funding behavior is very reminiscent of the late 1990s bubble.
“And the behavior that you'll see for the competition in those dollars is very reminiscent of the late 90s.”
Druckenmiller blames financial crisis on easy money bubbles and questions current low interest rate levels.
“I will go to my grave believing that that financial crisis happened because of bubbles created by easy money. And I just don't understand why we need interest rates where they are now.”
Marks argues bubbles exist because overpriced markets can become more overpriced before eventually reverting.
“And if it were true that every overpriced markets reverts and becomes fairly priced, then we would never get a bubble because they would stop going up here.”
Gurley says in the recent boom every venture firm started multiple funds, slowly piling up risk unknowingly.
“And in this past boom, in addition to everyone starting a venture firm, every venture firm started multiple venture firms and growth firms, and all that money gets piled up and you're slowly taking on risk and you don't realize it. It's like the roller coaster goes, nink, nink, nink, nink, nink.”
Gurley says firms that exited in the late 1990s bubble missed the vast majority of returns.
“But the vast majority of the returns are in these periods at the top of these bubbles.”
Gurley observes venture markets rise slowly but crash immediately, based on experiencing three bubble cycles.
“Yeah. Look, I've lived through three different bubbles and bursts in this industry, and unfortunately, it's highly cyclical. And when you and and it tends to go up slowly, and it tends to crash immediately.”
Gurley says the venture industry is highly cyclical, rising slowly but crashing immediately across three bubbles.
“I've lived through three different bubbles and bursts in this industry, and unfortunately, it's highly cyclical. And when you and and it tends to go up slowly, and it tends to crash immediately.”
Gerstner asks whether the zero-rate bubble matched 1999 and if it requires four to five years to clear.
“And will it take us the same four or five years that it took in 1999 for the world to work through that entire, backlog?”
Marks notes that while the internet transformed society, 99% of internet stocks from 1999 are worthless.
“Can you imagine the world today without the internet? And yet I imagine that 99% of the internet stocks that came out are worthless today.”
Marks defines bubbles primarily as psychological excess where no price seems too high.
“To me, the main ingredient in bubbles is psychological excess. There's no such thing as a price too high.”
Marks says current AI frenzy has not reached bubble-level mania yet.
“And I don't detect that level of mania at this time, so I have not put the bubble label Right.”
Marks says he has not labeled current AI frenzy a bubble because mania has not reached critical level.
“And I don't detect that level of mania at this time, so I have not put the bubble label Right. On this on this incident.”
Marks judges that AI investing has not reached the critical mass of mania needed for a bubble.
“But to me, it just hasn't this is a judgment call. And to me, it just hasn't reached that critical mass of mania.”
Gerstner argues NVIDIA at 23-24x next year's earnings and 18x 2027 earnings isn't bubble territory.
“I think it's trading at 23, 24 times fully taxed earnings on next year's numbers, 18 times on 27 numbers. That is not the stuff that bubbles are made of.”
Marks is certain AI will irreversibly change society but questions whether its implementation will prove excessive in scope and financing.
“And the question is, will the implementation prove to have been excessive in scope and in in the way it's financed?”
Marks says nobody has explained how AI will change the world or become profitable despite its power.
“I've never heard anybody tell me how AI is going to change the world. We know it's a powerful force. Can think, it can process data.”
Gurley argues real technology waves necessarily attract speculation and bubble behavior as pairs.
“If the wave is real, then you're going to have bubble like behavior. Like they come together as a pair precisely because anytime there's very quick wealth creation, you're going to get a lot of people that want to come try and take advantage of that or participate in it.”
Marks says nobody can explain how AI will change the world, unlike the internet bubble where the vision was clearer.
“I've never heard anybody tell me how AI is going to change the world. We know it's a powerful force. Can think, it can process data.”
“I always make this point that the bubbles are very, very around something new because the imagination is untrammed and it can go off in a flight of fancy.”
Marks argues bubbles never form around prosaic industries like timber because outcomes are too predictable.
“You're never going to have a bubble in paper stocks or timber stocks. It's too prosaic. People can say, well, we can tell how many houses you're going to build.”
Marks cites Thinking Machine Labs raising two billion dollars at twelve billion valuation without disclosing its product as bubble behavior.
“some woman left OpenAI, started a company called Thinking Machine Labs, went out to raise money, and she said this company is going to engage in AI, but I can't tell you what we're going to do. It's a secret. And people gave her $2,000,000,000 for a sixth of the company.”
Marks notes a company raised money at $50 billion valuation without disclosing its product as a warning sign.
“And at the time I was writing the memo, she was out trying to raise more money at a $50,000,000,000 valuation for a company that wouldn't say what its product is.”
Gurley argues real disruptive waves like AI naturally create bubbles alongside genuine innovation.
“And so I think that's where we are right now. It's real, it's disruptive, it's amazing, it it's changing a lot of different things in industry.”
Baker argues this may be the first true capacity cycle and that fundamental shortages help avoid a destructive bubble.
“This may be the first true capacity cycle. And I and and I and I do think that these fundamental shortages are good for us as investors.”
Baker argues Taiwan Semi's capacity discipline is single-handedly preventing an AI bubble.
“So Taiwan Semi, if we don't get a bubble, we need to throw a party for them because they will have single handedly prevented a bubble.”
Marks lists historical technological innovations from railroads in 1860s through internet in 2000 as comparisons.
“So the technological innovations I'm talking about, let's just for a starting point, let's say the railroads back in the 1860s And then radio in the nineteen twenties, the automobile, computers in the nineteen fifties and sixties, internet in 2000.”
Marks says every prior technological bubble saw too much capital flow in, too much infrastructure built, and investors lose money.
“In every case, too much capital flowed in. I think it's fair to say too much infrastructure was built and prices were paid that were too high.”
Marks wrote that if AI exuberance doesn't produce a money-losing bubble, it will be the first technological innovation not to.
“So I wrote in a memo recently this year, and I think it's true that if this technological innovation with its exuberance doesn't produce a money losing bubble, it'll be the first.”
Marks argues if AI exuberance does not produce a money-losing bubble, it will be the first such innovation.
“if this technological innovation with its exuberance doesn't produce a money losing bubble, it'll be the first. And now it could happen. You know, you can't rule these things out.”
“I published a note, I think in, February 2000 after six weeks of looking at these stocks.”