6 years apart
11 Oct 2019
“my advice to Blair, which he didn't follow, because I'm not a policy guy, but I said, look, what we should have because bits of the Iraqi army were not particularly contaminated by Saddam Hussein.”
spoken ·Cliveden Literary Festival·source
13 Mar 2026
“I mean, the huge mistake that Bremer made in Iraq on which we were not consulted, I was chief at the time, was to disband the Iraqi military.”
spoken ·The Brink ·source
Dearlove told the Joint Intelligence Committee chairman that senior Iraqi staff were working seven days a week while the regime concentrated effort on anthrax production.
“, claimed senior staff were working seven days a week while the regime was concentrating a great deal of effort on the production of anthrax . Dearlove told the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Sir John Scarlett , that they were ”
Intelligence regarding alleged weapons of mass destruction came from an Iraqi source.
“ intelligence about alleged weapons of mass destruction provided by an Iraqi with ”
Dearlove says Iraq invasion decision placed 100% weight on intelligence rather than the usual 80% on overt information.
“when it came to persuading Parliament to vote in favor of the invasion, 100% of the decision weight on the policy was placed on the intelligence.”
Dearlove contends Iraqi intelligence sources told Saddam rearmament was more advanced than reality, misleading both Saddam and Western intelligence.
“And the people we were talking to, I think, were telling Saddam that the rearmament was much more advanced than it actually was.”
Dearlove argues Iraqi sources misled both Saddam and Western intelligence about rearmament progress out of fear.
“And the people we were talking to, I think, were telling Saddam that the rearmament was much more advanced than it actually was. So our sources themselves were telling Saddam stuff which wasn't entirely accurate.”
Dearlove says UK was not consulted on Bremer's dissolution of Iraqi military and advised Blair against it.
“The UK was not consulted on that issue. And my advice to Blair, which he didn't follow,”
Dearlove links French intelligence reversal to France's opposition to UN resolution on Iraq.
“Anyway, it subsequently became clear when the Iraqi situation evolved that the French were not keen on supporting a new UN resolution.”
Dearlove states there were indications Chirac received funding from Hussein for two French presidential elections.
“there were indications that Shirak had received funding from Hussein, both the nineteen ninety five presidential election and the two thousand and two presidential”
Dearlove says France asked UK to disregard intelligence about Iraq's uranium purchases weeks after sharing it.
“Several weeks after that visit, I got a call from an extremely senior French official saying, Richard, would you please disregard what we told you?”
Dearlove advised Blair not to dissolve Iraqi army and Ba'ath structures but Blair did not follow advice.
“And my advice to Blair, which he didn't follow, because I'm not a policy guy, but I said, look, what we should have because bits of the Iraqi army were not particularly contaminated by Saddam Hussein.”
Dearlove argues Iraq invasion decision placed 100% weight on intelligence rather than normal 80% policy mix.
“So as it were, the intelligence beam had too much weight on it and it buckled.”
Dearlove reveals he advised Blair not to dissolve Iraqi military structures but was not followed.
“my advice to Blair, which he didn't follow, because I'm not a policy guy, but I said, look, what we should have because bits of the Iraqi army were not particularly contaminated by Saddam Hussein.”
Dearlove indicates intelligence suggested Chirac received funding from Saddam Hussein for French presidential elections.
“And there were indications that Shirak had received funding from Hussein, both the nineteen ninety five presidential election and the two thousand and two presidential”
Dearlove reveals US general was in hangar with 400 Iraqi officers when disbandment order arrived ending their pensions simultaneously.
“I mean, the huge mistake that Bremer made in Iraq on which we were not consulted, I was chief at the time, was to disband the Iraqi military.”
Dearlove reveals an American general was meeting with 400 Iraqi officers about running Iraq when disbandment order arrived.
“the huge mistake that Bremer made in Iraq on which we were not consulted, I was chief at the time, was to disband the Iraqi military.”
Dearlove reveals he urged Blair to form a military council in Iraq instead of disbanding the army.
“the huge mistake that Brammer made in Iraq on which we were not consulted, I was chief at the time, was to disband the Iraqi military.”
Dearlove reveals 400 Iraqi officers lost pensions when disbanding order came mid-meeting about governance.
“He said to me last week, couple of weeks ago, that he was actually in a hangar in Baghdad talking to 400 senior Iraqi officers about running the country when the order came through to disband the army, and they all lost their pensions at the same time.”
Dearlove recounts recent conversation with senior American general confirming his Iraq military council advice.
“I mean, I was urging the Blair government to form a military council. And actually talking to an American general recently who was part of that group, who was in a very senior position,”